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Agreeing to disagree on climate policy
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Disagreements about the value of the utility discount rate – the
rate at which our concern for the welfare of future people declines
with their distance from us in time – are at the heart of the debate
about the appropriate intensity of climate policy. Seemingly small
differences in the discount rate yield very different policy pre-
scriptions, and no consensus ‘correct’ value has been identified.
We argue that the choice of discount rate is an ethical primitive:
there are many different legitimate opinions as to its value, and
none should receive a privileged place in economic analysis of cli-
mate policy. Rather, we advocate a social choice based approach
in which a diverse set of individual discount rates is aggregated
into a ‘representative’ rate. We show that performing this ag-
gregation efficiently leads to a time-dependent discount rate that
declines monotonically to the lowest rate in the population. We
apply this discounting scheme to calculations of the social cost of
carbon recently performed by the US government, and show that
it provides an attractive compromise between competing ethical
positions, and thus provides a possible resolution to the ethical
impasse in climate change economics.
Climate policy | Discounting | Social cost of carbon
Abbreviations: SCC, social cost of carbon
Significance statement: The social cost of carbon – the cost to soci-
ety of an additional ton of CO2 emissions – is a crucial measure of the
desirable intensity of climate policy. The models economists use to
calculate it are however highly sensitive to the choice of discount rate,
which measures our concern for the well-being of future generations.
Different economists favor different values, and this leads to radically
different policy prescriptions. We present a method for combining a
diverse set of discount rates into a single ‘representative’ rate, and
apply it to the analysis of the social cost of carbon performed by the
US government. This approach may help to resolve ethical conflicts,
and hence lead to consensus policy recommendations.
A central feature of the economic analysis of climate change pol-icy is that it requires us to weigh costs and benefits that are
distributed across very long time horizons. Most of the benefits of
policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will only be
realized by future generations, while their costs must be born by us
today. Any sensible climate policy thus needs to trade off future ben-
efits against current costs.
Economists who study climate change have a standard tool for
aggregating consequences that are distributed across time. They
make use of dynamic social welfare functions of the discounted utili-
tarian type. Let c(t) be a measure of the set of goods and services we
consume at time t. Then under discounted utilitarianism a policy that
gives rise to a sequence of consumption c(t) is preferred to a policy
that gives rise to the sequence c˜(t) if and only if∫ ∞
τ
U(c(t))e−δ(t−τ)dt >
∫ ∞
τ
U(c˜(t))e−δ(t−τ)dt [1]
where τ is the current time, U(c) is a utility function which is as-
sumed to be increasing and concave (U ′ > 0, U ′′ ≤ 0), and δ > 0
is the utility discount rate, also known as the pure rate of time prefer-
ence. This approach aggregates future utilities additively, but down-
weights welfare consequences that are distant in time by an expo-
nentially declining discount factor e−δt. The larger is the discount
factor δ, the more this welfare function favors policies that benefit
the present, rather than the future.
The normative justification for using the exponentially dis-
counted utility model for dynamic welfare analysis has been force-
fully laid out in the axiomatic work of Koopmans [1]. This model
respects two desirable properties of dynamic choice (independence
and stationarity, see e.g. [2]), as well as giving rise to optimal plans
that are time-consistent – the mere passage of time does not cause us
to alter the plans we made in the past. It has thus become the stan-
dard method for policy choice and evaluation in dynamic contexts,
including climate change.
Whose discount rate?. While there is a near unanimous adherence
to the social welfare function defined by (1) in climate economics,
there are substantial and persistent disagreements about the appropri-
ate value of the discount rate δ. These disagreements are encapsu-
lated by a long-standing debate between two of the most well-known
proponents of the field – Nicholas Stern and William Nordhaus – who
recommend values for δ of 0.1%/yr and 1.5%/yr respectively. While
a 1.4% difference in δ may not seem like much, it has an enormous
effect on policy recommendations. Stern [3] recommends aggres-
sive mitigation investments, while Nordhaus’ analysis [4] argues for
a much less intensive climate policy. This is reflected in the fact that
the value of the social cost of carbon (the estimated welfare cost of
emitting one additional ton of CO2) obtained by Stern is more than
10 times Nordhaus’ value. The cause of these widely different policy
recommendations can be traced largely to the different discount rates
the two authors assume in their analysis [4]1. Other commentators
have also argued for their own preferred values of δ, with no con-
vergence to a single unanimously agreed upon value in sight. Given
the important effect δ has on policy prescriptions, this disagreement
has led to an uncomfortable stalemate in climate change economics,
which has led some to question the value of economic models of the
issue [5].
Our view is that the choice of δ represents a primitive ethical
judgement – it captures how much one cares about the welfare of
future generations. As such, it is a parameter that is unique to each
individual – much like the moral legitimacy of the death penalty or
abortion rights, it is the kind of thing reasonable people can reason-
ably disagree about2. Once we adopt this position, it becomes clear
Reserved for Publication Footnotes
1The Stern review initially also chose a low value of the elasticity of marginal utility (i.e. η=1,
where η is defined in (5) below), thus compounding the differences between its analysis and
that of Nordhaus (who uses η = 2). The postscript to the review however contains a sensitivity
analysis over η. Arguably, η has more of a positive flavour than δ as it measures aversion
to inequality, including contemporaneous inequality, and can thus be estimated empirically, as
we discuss below. There is no conceptual difficulty with accounting for heterogeneous utility
functions too (see e.g. [7, 8]), but analytic solutions for the representative discount rate are not
possible in this case. We keep to the case of common utility functions in order to simplify the
exposition.
2Remarkably, both Stern and Nordhaus enunciate this position in their writings. Stern [6]:
“Value judgements are, of course, precisely that and there will be many different positions.”
Nordhaus [4]: “It should be clear that alternative ethical perspectives are possible...[and]
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 PNAS Issue Date Volume Issue Number 1–5
that the economist’s role is not to impose his or her own preferences
on society, but rather to adopt a welfare framework that aims to rep-
resent the distribution of ethical views. There are no objectively ‘cor-
rect’ values of δ, only different ethical positions, and each should
be given some weight in policy prescriptions. The analysis of cli-
mate policy thus becomes an exercise in social choice – we need to
aggregate the diverse preferences of individuals into a representative
discount rate, and use this to evaluate policy options.
Discounting under disagreement
Individuals with different discount rates have different preferences
over the timing of consumption. Those with high discount rates will
have stronger preferences for immediate consumption, while those
with low discount rates will be more willing to defer consumption
into the future. Given a set of policy choices (e.g. global mitigation
effort and savings rates) the total quantity of global consumption is
determined by technological and climatic factors. The question re-
mains however what the value of this consumption path is to society.
In order to decide this, we need a rule for allocating global consump-
tion between individuals with different discount rates. It is natural to
require that such an allocation should be efficient. An allocation is
efficient if it is not possible to alter it to make one person better off
without making someone else worse off.
Efficient consumption allocations can be determined through the
follow procedure. Let global consumption per capita at time t be
C(t). Suppose that a planner allocates consumption ci(t) to individ-
ual i with discount rate δi according to
max
ci(t)
∑
i
wi
∫ ∞
τ
U(ci(t))e
−δitdt s.t.
∑
i
ci(t) = C(t) [2]
where wi are a set of positive Pareto weights, with
∑
i wi = 1. It
is well know that allocations ci(t) chosen in this manner will be effi-
cient. To ensure equal treatment we further assume that wi is chosen
to coincide with the proportion of individuals in the population with
discount rate δi.
Given this allocation rule, which discount rate should we use to
evaluate global consumption streams C(t)? In order to answer this
question we need to find a representative agent whose preferences
over global consumption streams will be derived endogenously from
the efficient sharing rule defined in (2). This approach was pioneered
by [7], and has been generalized by us in [8]. Formally, we solve for
the efficient allocations c∗i (t) that solve the optimization problem in
(2). These solutions will depend on the global consumption stream
C(t) and on time, i.e. c∗i (t) = c
∗
i (C(t), t). We can then define the
group’s instantaneous welfare from global per capita consumption
C(t) through
V (C(t), t) =
∑
i
wiU(c
∗
i (C(t), t))e
−δit. [3]
This function captures the group’s preferences over global consump-
tion streams C(t). The utility discount rate of the representative
agent is then given by minus the elasticity of marginal welfare with
respect to time:
δ∗(C(t), t) = −
∂2V
∂C∂t
∂V
∂C
. [4]
To simplify the analysis3, assume that agents’ utility functions U(c)
take the widely used iso-elastic form:
U(c) =
{
c1−η
1−η η 6= 1
ln c η = 1
[5]
Here η ≥ 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility, which measures
aversion to consumption inequality. To understand its interpretation,
imagine that a rich person with consumption c donates $1 to a con-
temporaneous poor person who has consumption c/2, but that only a
fraction x of this transfer arrives in the poor person’s pocket. With the
utility function (5) this transfer is socially desirable if x > (1/2)η .
Thus for η = 1 half of this ‘leaky’ transfer needs to reach the poor
person in order for it to be socially beneficial, but for η = 2 only
a quarter of the transfer needs to arrive. In general, the larger is η,
the more averse to consumption inequality we are, and the more we
are willing to pay to decrease inequality. We will discuss estimated
values for η below.
With the iso-elastic utility function (5) the group’s discount rate
can be shown to be given by (see derivation in the Appendix):
δ∗η(t) =
∑
i δi(wie
−δit)
1
η∑
i(wie
−δit)
1
η
. [6]
For this utility function the group’s discount rate does not depend on
C(t). It is simply a weighted sum of the individuals’ discount rates,
with time dependent weights yi(t) := (wie−δit)
1
η .
Defining the expectation operator Exi :=
∑
i xiyi(t)/
∑
i yi(t),
and differentiating (6) with respect to time we find
d
dt
δ∗η(t) = −1
η
(
Eδ2i − (Eδi)2
)
< 0. [7]
Also, letting i = L index the agent with the lowest discount rate, we
have
lim
t→∞
δ∗η(t) = lim
t→∞
δL +
∑
i 6=L δi(wi/wL)
1
η e−(δi−δL)t/η
1 +
∑
i 6=L(wi/wL)
1
η e−(δi−δL)t/η
= δL.
[8]
Thus although each member of the group has a constant discount
rate δi, the efficient discount rate for the group as a whole is time-
dependent, and declines monotonically to the lowest rate in the pop-
ulation.
Disagreement and the social cost of carbon
In this section we demonstrate how the theory of discounting under
disagreement can be applied to the analysis of climate policy. We
focus on the effects of discounting on estimates of the social cost of
carbon (SCC), perhaps the most important summary statistic in cli-
mate change economics. As mentioned above, the SCC measures the
welfare cost of an additional unit of CO2 emissions on current and
future generations. In a ‘first-best’ world it coincides with the op-
timal tax rate on CO2 emissions. The SCC has been the subject of
several studies commissioned by national governments, including a
recent one by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [9, 10]
which we will use as a point of comparison in our analysis.
In order to estimate the SCC we need an integrated model of the
climate-economy system which captures how the trajectory of future
global temperatures changes in response to an additional unit of CO2
emissions, how these climatic changes impact the global economy
over time, and finally how these impacts alter global consumption
and welfare. We will make use of a version of the well known DICE
integrated assessment model [4]. In order to make our analysis di-
rectly comparable to the EPA’s, our version of DICE makes use of
provide vastly different prescriptions about desirable climate change policies.” Both authors
nevertheless perform their analysis with a single preferred value of δ.
3See [7] and [8] for a general analysis with arbitrary, possibly heterogeneous, utility functions.
4The version of DICE used by the EPA makes use of 5 socio-economic scenarios, and a
large Monte Carlo sample from the probability distribution for the climate sensitivity parameter
derived in [11]. The final SCC values reported are an average over all scenarios and Monte
Carlo samples for a given value of the consumption discount rate. Our analysis uses an
identical methodology. Note however that the final summary values of the SCC adopted by
the EPA average estimates from three different integrated assessment models – DICE, PAGE,
and FUND. We just use the DICE model, as it is freely available and easy to implement. SCC
estimates from the DICE model fall between those from the other two models.
2 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 Footline Author
the same socio-economic scenarios and model parameterization as
their study4, with one important difference. The EPA used constant
values of the consumption discount rate in its analysis. For deter-
ministic consumption streams and iso-elastic utility, the consumption
discount rate ρ(t) is related to the utility discount rate δ through
ρ(t) = δ + ηg(t) [9]
where g(t) is the mean consumption growth rate up to time t (see e.g.
[2]). This is the rate that is used to discount changes in consumption
c(t), rather than changes in utility U(c(t)) which are discounted at
the rate δ. Since g(t) is in general non-constant in the DICE model,
even if δ is a constant as is conventionally assumed, the consump-
tion discount rate cannot be constant. Our analysis will thus make
use of the formula (9), in which the consumption discount rate is de-
rived from explicit welfare assumptions and the rate of consumption
growth that emerges endogenously from the DICE model, rather than
assuming an ad hoc constant rate.
In order to operationalize the discounting formula (9) we need to
specify values for δ and η. We consider three different schemes for
δ: First we use Stern’s value of δ = 0.1%, then Nordhaus’ value of
δ = 1.5%, and finally we consider the efficient discount rate under
disagreement δ = δ∗η(t) from (6), where we assume equal weights on
the Stern and Nordhaus values of δ. The value of η can be estimated
from a variety of empirical sources, including income tax schedules
[12], asset markets [13], and behavioral surveys [14]. While the em-
pirical literature is not without its problems, η = 2 is often taken as
a reasonable starting point [15], with values between 1 and 3 being
recommended for sensitivity analysis [16]. We adopt this approach,
and compute the SCC for η ∈ [1, 3] for each of our three choices for
δ using the EPA’s version of the DICE model. Our results are dis-
played in Figure 1. For reference we also plot the value of the SCC
for the three constant consumption discount rate scenarios used by
the EPA: ρ(t) ∈ {2.5%, 3%, 5%}.
As the figure makes clear, the values of the SCC computed with
the efficient discount rate δ∗η(t) lie between those computed with the
Stern and Nordhaus values of δ for each value of η. The SCC val-
ues under disagreement are derived from a procedure that is both
equitable and efficient, and thus achieve a successful compromise
between opposing viewpoints.
The SCC is a declining function of η in our simulations, with
differences in the value of δ having a large effect for small values of
η, and a smaller effect for larger values of η. This can be understood
by examining the formula for the consumption discount rate in (9)5.
Since ρ(t) is increasing in η, climate damages that are distant in time
are heavily discounted for large values of η. This gives rise to low
values of the SCC. For large enough η the weight placed on future
climate damages is already small for δ = 0, so changing the value
of δ has a comparatively small absolute effect on the SCC, as this
modifies an already small quantity. The relative effect of a change in
δ on the SCC is however still significant for large η, with the Stern
value being 74% larger than the Nordhaus value even for η = 3.
Regardless of the exact value of η, the efficient discount rate under
disagreement can thus be used to resolve empirically meaningful dis-
putes about the value of δ.
Conclusions
As many economists have emphasized (e.g. [19, 16]), ethical judge-
ments are intrinsic to climate change policy, and nowhere do they
play a greater role than in the question of how to discount the far
future. As with all ethical judgements, there is a plurality of legiti-
mate viewpoints about the appropriate value for the utility discount
rate. While public reasoning and debate can help us refine our po-
sitions, the outcome of this process is unlikely to result in a unique
consensus. As Amartya Sen has noted [20]: “Even the most vig-
orous critical examination can still leave conflicting arguments that
are not eliminated by impartial scrutiny”. How can rational policy
recommendations be made in an environment characterized by such
persistent and quantitatively important disagreements?
We have argued for a social choice based approach to climate
policy that reflects the diversity of opinion on ethical matters. This
has both pragmatic and philosophical advantages. Pragmatically our
approach provides a formal mechanism for avoiding impasses caused
by ethical disagreements. Everyone’s opinion counts, and no one can
claim that policy recommendations are derived from morally high-
handed modeling assumptions. Philosophically, our method draws
on a long democratic tradition in social choice theory that assigns
each preference an equal weight in public decision making to arrive
at a consensus that is acceptable to all.
We hope that the techniques we have identified will help to re-
solve debates about ‘the’ appropriate value of the discount rate, and
instead allow research attention to focus on empirical questions such
as the specification of the damage function in integrated assessment
models, and comprehensive quantifications of the uncertainty in the
technological and climatic components of these models [21]. While
ethical assumptions are important drivers of the policy recommen-
dations from integrated assessment models, this should not be seen
as a strike against them. Ethical positions will always be irreducibly
diverse, but we may nevertheless respectfully agree to disagree.
Appendix: Derivation of the representative discount rate
We can solve the maximization problem in (2) by the method of
Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian is
max
ci(t)
∑
i
wi
∫ ∞
τ
U(ci(t))e
−δitdt− λ(t)(
∑
i
ci(t)− C(t)) [10]
where λ(t) is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers. The first order
conditions for the efficient allocations c∗i (t) yield
c∗i (t) = U
′−1
(
λ(t)eδit
wi
)
, [11]
and the constraint
∑
i ci(t) = C(t) implies that∑
i
U ′−1
(
λ(t)eδit
wi
)
= C(t) [12]
Now assume that U(c) is an iso-elastic utility function, as in (5).
Then U ′−1(x) = x−
1
η . Substituting this relationship into (12) al-
lows us to solve for λ(t) in terms of C(t). This expressions for λ(t)
may in turn be substituted into (11) to find that
c∗i (t) =
(wie
−δit)1/η∑
i(wie
−δit)1/η
C(t). [13]
Substituting this expression into (3), we find that the group’s instan-
taneous welfare at the optimal allocation can be written as
V (C(t), t) =
C(t)1−η
1− η β(t) [14]
where the group’s effective discount factor β(t) is given by
β(t) =
(∑
i
(wie
−δit)1/η
)η
[15]
5Technically, since our computation of the SCC averages over many scenarios for global
consumption we should examine the certainty equivalent consumption discount rate ρˆ(t) =
δ + ηg(t)− 1
2
η2σ2(t), where σ2(t) is the variance in consumption growth at time t (see
e.g. [15]). In practice the variance term is much smaller than the other two terms in the stan-
dard parameterization of the DICE model, and can be neglected for qualitative purposes. This
is not however a generic result, and relies largely on the assumed functional form for the DICE
damage function at large temperatures. See [17] for a discussion of the effect of the choice of
damage function on the variance term in the discounting formula. The literature contains an
extensive analysis of how uncertainty in the consumption growth rate can also give rise to a
consumption discount rate ρˆ(t) that declines with time [15, 18].
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The group’s discount rate δ∗η(t) is then determined by (4) which re-
duces to
δ∗η(t) = − 1
β
dβ
dt
. [16]
Straightforward algebra then yields the expression for δ∗η(t) in (6).
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Fig. 1. The SCC as a function of η for two constant utility discount rates (Stern (black): δ =
0.1%, Nordhaus (red): δ = 1.5%), and for the efficient discount rate under disagreement
(blue) given by δ∗η(t) in (6). The values of the SCC under the three constant consumption
discount rate scenarios used by the EPA are indicated by the dashed lines.
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